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I. INTRODUCTION
When we create arguments, when we act as rhetoricians, we reveal
ourselves by the words and ideas we choose to employ. Verbal struc-
tures that are used widely and persistently are especially worth exami-
nation. Arguments made with repeated, almost formulaic, sets of words
suggest a second argument flowing beneath the apparent argument. Be-
neath the apparently abstract language and the syllogistic form of these
arguments, we may discover the deeper currents that explain, at least in
part, why we seem so attached to these verbal structures.
Argument about affirmative action in the context of racial discrimi-
nation is particularly wrenching and divisive, especially among people
who agree, formally speaking, on the immorality of racism.' In a world
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, University of
Virginia. I acknowledge the support and contribution of Susan P. Koniak and Maxine S. Krasnow.
1. See Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1327 (1986). (stating that "[flor over a decade [the coalition principally responsible
for the 'Civil Rights Revolution'] has been riven by bitter disagreement over the means by which
American society should attempt to overcome its racist past); see also Schnapper, Affirmative Ac-
tion and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985) (assert-
ing that throughout the persistent and strong disagreement among the Justices over the
constitutionality of affirmative action, the Justices have failed to address adequately the legislative
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where the dominant public ideology is one of nonracism, where the
charge of racism is about as explosive a rhetorical move as one can
make, disagreement about affirmative action often divides us in an an-
gry and tragic manner.
In this Paper, I examine a recurring element of the rhetoric of af-
firmative action. This element, the "rhetoric of innocence," relies on the
invocation of the "innocent white victim" of affirmative action. The
rhetoric of innocence is a rich source of the deeper currents of our af-
firmative action debate. By revealing those deeper currents, we may
gain a clearer sense of why the issue of affirmative action so divides
good people, white and of color.2
Getting clearer about ourselves often is painful and disturbing. For
history of the fourteenth amendment and the original intent of -its framers); Schwartz, The 1986
and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987)
(arguing that the 1986-1987 decisions reveal the divisive nature of the affirmative action issue);
Smith, Affirmative Action in Extremis: A Preliminary Diagnosis of the Symptoms and the
Causes, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1337 (1980) (asserting that the arguments over affirmative action seem
ceaseless and improperly focused). See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975);
Belton, Reflections on Affirmative Action After Paradise and Johnson, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
115 (1988) (discussing the continuing debate over the issue of consideration of race or sex in af-
firmative action settings); Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and
Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988) (addressing the variations
in constitutional and statutory standards in affirmative action cases); Scanlon, The History and
Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 343; Selig, Affirmative Action in Employment:
The Legacy of a Supreme Court Majority, 63 IND. L.J. 301, 306 (1988) (reviewing "the current
status of affirmative action in employment in the wake of the Court's 1986 and 1987 decisions");
Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
775 (1979) (observing that the question of the extent to which the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments required the exercise of color blindness in allocation or regulation remains
unsettled after a century of debate); Weeden, The Status of Affirmative Action in 1986 and Be-
yond, 31 How. L.J. 33 (1988) (arguing that America ought to adopt "an aggressive national race-
conscious affirmative action policy"); Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Reme-
dies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 214 (1980) (stating that the view of equality which demands that
everyone be treated equally without regard to race "permits the continuation, indeed the exacerba-
tion, of grave disparities in the opportunities and advantages available to persons of different
races").
Professor Derrick Bell has chosen narrative as his vehicle for speaking to the question of af-
firmative action and race. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2382 (1989); Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1985). In another paper I argued that our best hope of escaping the rhetorical
impasse of affirmative action is through just the sort of narratives which Professor Bell and Justice
Marshall have offered. See Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381 (1989). On the
power of narrative in law, see the articles in the LEGAL STORYTELLING issue of the Michigan Law
Review. 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073-2494 (1989).
2. The names attached to a particular race is a sensitive matter. It also can be a powerful
rhetorical move. In this Paper, I shall use the term "black" to refer to people of African ancestry. I
use this term because it contrasts so sharply with the term "white" race. The obvious connection
between the color white and the cultural conception of innocence, and the corollary connection
between "black" and noninnocence, make "white" and "black" proper terms to use here.
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many readers, this discomfort will be the case here. Put simply, the
rhetoric of innocence is connected to racism. It is connected in several
ways, but most disturbingly, the rhetoric embodies and reveals the un-
conscious racism in each of us. This unconscious racism embedded in
our rhetoric accounts, at least in part, for the tragic impasse we reach in
our conversations about affirmative action. My hope is that by dragging
out these deeper and darker parts of our rhetoric, we may have a better
chance of continuing our conversation. If we can each acknowledge the
racism that we cannot entirely slough off, we may be able to move past
that painful, disturbing assumption and talk of what we ought to do
about it.
This Paper has three parts that follow this Introduction. Part II
defines the "rhetoric of innocence" and traces its history. Part III ex-
plores the cultural conception of "innocence" and the idea of "uncon-
scious racism" and explains how innocence and racism come together in
the rhetoric. Part IV concludes by suggesting how all this discussion
might help us in our struggle to get to a world where racism is banished,
not just forbidden.
II. THE RHETORIC OF INNOCENCE
A persistent and apparently important part of the affirmative ac-
tion dialogue, both judicial and academic, is what can be termed the
"rhetoric of innocence."'3 The rhetoric of innocence is used most
3. See Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986). Professor Sullivan powerfully criticized the
rhetoric of innocence and its search for perpetrators and victims, suggesting that "voluntary af-
firmative action is as defensible as the architecture of a better future as it is a remedy for sins of
discrimination past." Id. at 97; see also Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049
(1978). Professor Freeman criticized what he called the "perpetrator perspective" in the context of
antidiscrimination law:
The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of atomistic individuals
whose actions are outside of and apart from the social fabric and without historical con-
tinuity. From this perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a social phenome-
non, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors ....
[This perspective] gives rise to a complacency about one's own moral status; it creates a
class of "innocents," who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associ-
ated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment when called upon to bear
any burdens in connection with remedying violations.
Id. at 1054-55 (footnotes omitted). See generally Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A
Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 539 (1982) (arguing that the "dis-
tributive justice claims of the 'innocent' parties" depend on a nonexistent society in which equality
of opportunity exists from the outset); Ellis, Victim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to
Discrimination, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575, 595 (1985) (asserting that although critics
contend that affirmative action harms "innocent" white workers, "white Americans cannot cloak
themselves in a mantle of innocence by simply failing to acknowledge that racism has become
1990]
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powerfully by those who seek to deny or severely to limit affirmative
action, the "white rhetoricians. '4 This rhetoric has two related forms.
First, the white rhetorician may argue the plight of the "innocent
white victims" of the affirmative action plan. The white applicant to
medical school, the white contractor seeking city construction contracts,
and so on, are each "innocent" in a particular sense of the word. Their
"innocence" is a presumed feature, not the product of any actual and
particular inquiry. It is presumed that the white victim is not guilty of a
institutionalized to protect the white beneficiaries of the status quo"); Fallon & Weiler, Firefight-
ers v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 27 (stating that
"[p]referential employment remedies typically result in the exclusion from employment opportuni-
ties of a class of persons, most often white males, who themselves may be innocent of any race-
based wrongdoing"); Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 450-51 (1980) (arguing that group focused
remedies are inconsistent with Title VII because they impose costs on innocent white employees
while providing benefits to individuals who have not been identified as victims of discrimination).
The briefs in several of the important affirmative action cases also contain the rhetoric. See
Brief for Appellee at 30, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (No. 87-998)
(contending that the definition "impacts innocent third parties to such an extent that it is not
narrowly tailored enough to achieve the objective of the plan"); Brief for Petitioner at 42, Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129) (asserting that "[t]he Court of Ap-
peals' decision would permit not only plans with no legitimate remedial purpose but also plans
which impose disproportionate burdens on other innocent employees and trammel their individual
rights unnecessarily"); Reply Brief for the EEOC at 19, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) (No. 84-1656) (arguing that "according such preferential treatment to persons who have
no claim to a 'rightful place' in the employer's workforce necessarily deprives innocent third par-
ties of their 'rightful place'" (emphasis in original)); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 11, Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340) (contending that "[c]ertainly, an employer
cannot deprive innocent employees of their civil rights without any showing that there are contin-
uing effects of past discrimination that must be remedied at their expense" (emphasis in original));
Brief for Petitioner at 11, Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (No. 84-1999)
(arguing that "[b]y awarding superseniority to persons not shown to have been victims of discrimi-
nation at the expense of innocent non-minority firefighters, the District Court has well exceeded
the authority granted by Title VII and the decree should therefore be ruled invalid"); Brief for
Petitioner, General Building Contractors of New York State, Inc., The New York State Building
Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. at 10, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980) (No. 78-1007) (asserting that the "Court has recognized that there is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest for racial classification preferences only where minorities were victims of dis-
crimination by a particular employer"); Brief for Respondents at 74-75, United States
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (No. 78-432, -435, -436) (asserting that "[the adminis-
trative inconvenience of identifying individual victims of discrimination does not justify broad ra-
cial preferences that disadvantage innocent employees").
The rhetoric of innocence has not always been used to argue against the interests of blacks.
The "innocent black victim" was an important part of the abolitionist rhetoric in antebellum
America. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 216 (1975).
4. I do not use the term "white rhetorician" to designate the race of the rhetorician. It is the
white perspective, or the "whiteness" of the rhetoric, that makes the label appropriate, whatever
the race of the rhetorician. The power of rhetorical perspective of course is not limited to the
discourse of affirmative action. See, e.g., Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Jus-
tice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). In her thoughtful exploration of the "dilemmas of
difference," Professor Minow reminds us: "Court judgments endow some perspectives, rather than
others, with power." Id. at 94.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
racist act that has denied the minority applicant the job or other posi-
tion she seeks; in that particular sense of the word, the white person is
"innocent." The white rhetorician usually avoids altogether questions
that suggest a different and more complex conception of innocence in
these matters. Most importantly, the rhetoric of innocence avoids the
argument that white people generally have benefited from the oppres-
sion of people of color, that white people have been advantaged by this
oppression in a myriad of obvious and less obvious ways. Thus, the
rhetoric of innocence obscures this question: What white person is "in-
nocent," if innocence is defined as the absence of advantage at the ex-
pense of others?
The second and related part of the rhetoric of innocence is the
questioning of the "actual victim" status of the black beneficiary of the
affirmative action plan. Because an affirmative action plan does not re-
quire particular and individualized proof of discrimination, the rhetori-
cian is able to question or deny the "victim" status of the minority
beneficiary of the plan. "Victim" status thereby is recognized only for
those who have been subjected to particular and proven racial discrimi-
nation with regard to the job or other interest at stake. As with the first
part of the rhetoric, the argument avoided is the one that derives from
societal discrimination: if discrimination against people of color is per-
vasive, what black person is not an "actual victim"?
These two parts work as a unitary rhetoric. Within this rhetoric,
affirmative action plans have two important effects. They hurt innocent
white people, and they advantage undeserving black people. The unjust
suffering of the white person becomes the source of the black person's
windfall. These conjoined effects give the rhetoric power. Affirmative
action does not merely do bad things to good ("innocent") people nor
merely do good things for bad ("undeserving") people; affirmative ac-
tion does both at once and in coordination. Given the obvious power of
the rhetoric of innocence, its use and persistence in the opinions of
those Justices who seek to deny or severely to limit affirmative action is
not surprising.
The Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence essentially
began with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.5 From its
beginning in Bakke through the most recently decided cases, the Court
has splintered again and again, and the Justices have authored opinions
that constitute a bitter and divisive dialogue.' Within that dialogue the
rhetoric of innocence is a persistent and powerful presence.
In Bakke a majority of the Court struck down a medical school
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1530-44 (1988).
1990]
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admissions program that set aside a specific number of places for mi-
norities only.7 The majority concluded that, although the admissions
process might take account of race, the quota system employed by the
state medical school either violated Title VI or denied the white appli-
cants their constitutional right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.'
Justice Lewis Powell introduced the rhetoric of innocence to the
Court's affirmative action discourse while announcing the judgment for
the Court in Bakke. He used the rhetoric several times in the course of
the opinion. Powell wrote of the patent unfairness of "innocent persons
. . . asked to endure. . . [deprivation as] the price of membership in
the dominant majority."9 He wrote of "forcing innocent persons . . . to
bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making."'10 In a
passage that embodies both the assumption of white innocence and the
questioning of black victimization, Powell distinguished the school de-
segregation cases and other precedents in which racially drawn reme-
dies were endorsed.
The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination. . . . In
the school cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs
worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more fo-
cused than the remedying of the effects of "societal discrimination," an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.
We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as mem-
bers of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in
the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory violations.. . .Without such findings of constitutional or statutory viola-
tions, it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one
individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no
compelling justification for inflicting such harm.1
Thus Powell, who sought to circumscribe tightly the ambit of affirma-
tive action, relied on the rhetoric of innocence.
In contrast to Powell's opinion, the dissenting opinions in Bakke
7. The admissions program in question in Bakke was a special program completely separate
from the regular admissions procedure. If an applicant indicated on the regular application form a
desire to be considered as a member of a "minority group," the application was forwarded to a
special admissions committee. This committee then reviewed these candidates and rated them ac-
cording to interview summaries, grade point averages, and test scores. Unlike the regular candi-
dates, the special candidates did not have to meet the minimum grade point average of 2.5. The
special candidates also were not compared to the general applicants; rather, they were compared
only among themselves. The special committee then recommended candidates for admission until
the number prescribed by the faculty was admitted. In 1974 this number was 16 out of a class of
100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-75.
8. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 421 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
9. Id. at 294 n.34 (opinion of Powell, J.).
10. Id. at 298.
11. Id. at 307-09 (citations and footnote omitted).
[Vol. 43:297
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authored by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall each
challenged the premises of the rhetoric. Justice Brennan rejected the
idea of requiring proof of individual and specific discrimination as a
prerequisite to affirmative action.'2 Marshall attacked directly the rhet-
oric of white innocence and the questioning of black victimization: "It is
unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the
racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of
wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact.""
The rhetoric of innocence continued in the cases following Bakke.
In Fullilove v. Klutznik14 a majority of the Court upheld a federal stat-
ute mandating a ten percent set-aside for minority contractors in feder-
ally supported public works projects. Justice Warren Burger made use
of the rhetoric of innocence, even while writing to uphold the set-aside:
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the
effects of prior discrimination. . . 'a sharing of the burden' by innocent
parties is not impermissible." He proceeded to emphasize the "rela-
tively light" burden imposed on the white contractors and the flexible
nature of the set-aside provisions. 6 Thus, although Justice Burger
wrote an opinion that upholds a particular affirmative action program,
he used the rhetoric of innocence to emphasize the limitations of his
endorsement. Burger thereby implied that a heavier burden on the in-
nocent white parties might have made the plan unconstitutional.
Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting in Fullilove, expressed the rheto-
ric in both its "innocence" and "actual victimization" parts:
[The federal statute's characteristics] are not the characteristics of a racially
conscious remedial decree that is closely tailored to the evil to be corrected. In
today's society, it constitutes far too gross an oversimplification to assume that
12. "Such relief does not require as a predicate proof that recipients of preferential advance-
ment have been individually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a
general class of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination." Id. at 363 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
13. Id. at 400 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
14. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) provision was created as
part of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 with the purpose of directing funds into the
minority business community. The amendment provided that no grant would be made for public
works unless at least 10% of the amount of the grant was to be expended for minority business
enterprises. Id. at 453. A MBE was defined to be "'a business at least 50 per centum of which is
owned by minority group members or, in case of publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of
the stock of which is owned by minority group members."' Id. at 459 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
6705(f)(2) (1982)). The grantee was required to give "satisfactory assurance" that this requirement
would be complied with before the grant would be issued. The provision was designed to eliminate
the longstanding disparity in participation in public contracting caused by both blatant and indi-
rect discrimination. Id.
15. Id. at 484 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976)).
16. Id.
1990]
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every single Negro, Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut
potentially interested in construction contracting currently suffers from the effects
of past or present racial discrimination. Since the MBE set-aside must be viewed as
resting upon such an assumption, it necessarily paints with too broad a brush. Ex-
cept to make whole the identified victims of racial discrimination, the guarantee of
equal protection prohibits the government from taking detrimental action against
innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their own race."'
Justice Powell again invoked the rhetoric in his majority opinion in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.18 In Wygant the majority
struck down the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement that
gave blacks greater protection from layoffs than that accorded white
teachers with more seniority. The agreement was a product of prior liti-
gation seeking to provide meaningful integration of the school faculties
in the county. Without the special protection for the newly hired black
teachers, the layoffs essentially would have undone the previous inte-
gration efforts. The majority nonetheless concluded that the agreement
violated the constitutional rights of the laid-off white teachers. 19
Justice Powell rejected the sufficiency of what he termed "societal
discrimination":
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy.... No one doubts that there has been serious racial
discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal
remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient
and over-expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability
to affect the future.20
Thus, mere societal discrimination is an insufficient predicate for the
disadvantaging of innocent white teachers. This "societal discrimina-
tion" point is an important variant of the rhetoric of innocence. The
black teachers are not real victims; they are subject merely to societal
discrimination, a phenomenon that seems weak and abstract, practiced
by no one in particular against no one in particular. 1
17. Id. at 530 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In a rather odd extension of the rhetoric, Stewart
labeled affirmative action as a form of modem nobility, "the creation once again by government of
privileges based on birth." Id. at 531. By this analogy the black beneficiaries of affirmative action
are like the European noblemen of the Old World, enjoying great and utterly unearned advantage
at the expense of the whites, who are like the feudal serfs.
18. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
19. Id. at 270-73.
20. Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
21. Powell again revealed his commitment to the conception of innocence when he used the
term "innocent" to describe the disadvantaged white five times in a brief two-paragraph passage
contrasting Wygant with the Court's precedents:
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the effects of prior discrimination,
it may be necessary to take race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicat-
ing racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of
the remedy. "When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of
[Vol. 43:297304
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Justice Bryon White wrote separately in Wygant. For him the case
was simple. White reasoned: The firing of white teachers to make room
for blacks in order to integrate the faculty would be patently unconsti-
tutional; laying off whites to keep blacks on the job is the same thing;
therefore, the layoff provision is unconstitutional. In White's pithy one
paragraph opinion he used the "actual victimization" part of the rheto-
ric, referring to "blacks, none of whom has been shown to be a victim of
any racial discrimination."22
The recent case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 2s continues
the uninterrupted use of the rhetoric of innocence in affirmative action
dialogue within the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for
the Court struck down Richmond's ordinance setting aside thirty per-
cent of the dollar amount of city construction contract work for minor-
ity contractors.2  Her opinion relied on the essential premises and
prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible.
In Fuililove, the challenged statute required at least 10 percent of federal public works funds
to be used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. This requirement was
found to be within the remedial powers of Congress in part because the "actual 'burden'
shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light."
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved layoffs. Here, by contrast, the
means chosen to achieve the Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority teachers with less seniority. We
have previously expressed concern over the burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes
on innocent parties. In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent
individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring goals
may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury
that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of
an existing job.
Id. at 280-83 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)).
22. Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring).
23. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
24. The Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan) adopted by the Richmond City Coun-
cil in 1983 provided for a 30% set-aside. Any prime contractor to whom the city awarded a con-
struction contract was required to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar value of the contract to
Minority Business Enterprises. See supra note 14. Recipients of the set-aside were not limited to
local contractors; any qualified MBE was entitled to participate in the Plan. A partial or complete
waiver would be granted only upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances." The lowest bidder
on a city construction contract was required to submit a form naming the MBEs to be used and
the percentage of the contract price awarded to minority firms, or to use the form to request a
waiver. The form then was transferred to the Human Relations Commission, which verified the
MBEs named and either approved the commitment form or made a recommendation concerning
the request for waiver. The Director of General Services made all final determinations. The pur-
pose of the ordinance was to promote greater participation by MBEs in public construction con-
tracts. Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 707-08.
The Richmond ordinance obviously was patterned after the federal program that was vali-
dated in the Fullilove case. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor distin-
gnished Fullilove by arguing that, unlike the Richmond City Council, Congress especially is
empowered under the fourteenth amendment to address racial discrimination. "What appellant
ignores is that Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional
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conclusion of the rhetoric without using the usual phrases. Justice
O'Connor wrote of the "generalized assertions" and "amorphous claim"
of racism in the Richmond construction industry, thereby denying the
actual victimization of the black beneficiaries.2 5
Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring in Richmond, used both the
premises and the usual language of the rhetoric. Stevens denied the
"actual victim" status of the minority contractors, stating that "[t]he
class of persons benefited by the ordinance is not, however, limited to
victims of ... discrimination. 28 Continuing the rhetoric of innocence,
he pointed out the innocent status of at least some of the white contrac-
tors: "[T]he disadvantaged class of white contractors presumably in-
cludes. .. some who have never discriminated against anyone on the
basis of race."27
Justice Antonin Scalia, who has staked out the most extreme an-
tiaffirmative action position on the Court, concurred in the Richmond
judgment but was dissatisfied with O'Connor's reasoning. He would de-
clare essentially all affirmative action unconstitutional, unless it was a
response to a particular and proven act of discrimination against a per-
son of color. This approach, as Scalia concedes, is not affirmative action
but merely a remedy for a particular cognizable wrong.28 This position
rejects the "actual victimization" status of blacks who benefit from any
true affirmative action plan. By contrast Justice Scalia expressed in his
mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.... Thus, our treatment of an
exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be dispositive here." Id. at 719-20.
25. O'Connor stated:
[A] generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry pro-
vides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to
remedy....
.[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular indus-
try cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.
Id. at 723-24.
26. Id. at 732 (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 733.
28. Scalia wrote:
I agree with the Court's dictum that a fundamental distinction must be drawn between
the effects of "societal" discrimination and the effects of "identified" discrimination, and that
the situation would be different if Richmond's plan were "tailored" to identify those particu-
lar bidders who "suffered from the effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contrac-
tors." In my view, however, the reason that would make a difference is not, as the Court
states, that it would justify race-conscious action-but rather that it would enable race-neu-
tral remediation. Nothing prevents Richmond from according a contracting preference to
identified victims of discrimination. While most of the beneficiaries might be black, neither
the beneficiaries nor those disadvantaged by the preference would be identified on the basis
of their race. In other words, far from justifying racial classification, identification of actual
victims of discrimination makes it less supportable than ever, because more obviously
unneeded.
Id. at 738-39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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Richmond opinion deep concern for the white victims of affirmative
action.
[E]ven "benign" racial quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we
ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged
on the basis of race. . . When we depart from this American principle we play
with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson, or Croson burns.2"
In dissent Justice Marshall challenged the "actual victimization"
part of the rhetoric. He chronicled the City of Richmond's "disgraceful
recent history" of racism, "multifarious acts of discrimination, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the deliberate diminution of black residents'
voting rights, resistance to school desegregation, and publicly sanc-
tioned housing discrimination. ' 30 Marshall characterized the majority
position as ignoring the real and continuing victimization of blacks:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different standard of re-
view under the Constitution than the most brute and repugnant forms of state-
sponsored racism, a majority of this Court signals that it regards racial discrimina-
tion as largely a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies need no
longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice. I, however, do not be-
lieve this Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial discrimination or its ves-
tiges. In constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the majority today does a grave
disservice not only to those victims of past and present racial discrimination in this
Nation whom government has sought to assist, but also to this Court's long tradi-
tion of approaching issues of race with the utmost sensitivity.3
1
In Marshall's vision, "[t]he battle against pernicious racial discrimina-
tion or its effects is nowhere near won. '3 2
Although it is Justice Marshall's dissent in Richmond that chal-
lenges the rhetoric of innocence most directly and powerfully, Justice
Harry Blackmun's brief dissent contains a sentence that suggests the
more complex notion of "innocence" which is obscured by the white
rhetoricians: "History is irrefutable, even though one might sympathize
with those who-though possibly innocent in themselves-benefit from
the wrongs of past decades."33
From Bakke through Richmond the Court has splintered on the
issue of affirmative action. Although the Richmond case shows the
promise of a greater clarity, the constitutional status of affirmative ac-
tion remains uncertain. 4 Through the splintering and uncertainty, the
29. Id. at 739.
30. Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 752.
32. Id. at 757.
33. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. The Richmond case simply may clarify that affirmative action is to be significantly cur-
tailed. See Cooper, A Slow Return to Constitutional Colorblindness, LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 1989, at
27, 28 (stating that "Croson may well mark the penultimate step in the Court's journey from
Bakke back to Brown"); Norton & Norton, A Setback for Minority Businesses, id. at 31 (observing
that over the past 25 years the challenge ironically has changed from the receptivity of state and
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rhetoric of innocence persists as an important tool in the hands of those
who seek to limit the use of affirmative action. The deeper nature and
special power of this important rhetoric is the subject of the balance of
this Paper.
III. INNOCENCE AND RACISM
It is hard to know whether, and how, rhetoric works. We do know,
however, that both judges and academicians often use the rhetoric of
innocence. Those who use the rhetoric presumably find it persuasive or
at least useful. What then could be the sources and nature of its appar-
ent power?
A. Innocence
The power of the rhetoric of innocence comes in part from the
power of the conception of "innocence" in our culture. The idea of in-
nocent victims, particularly when coupled with the specter of those who
victimize them, is a pervasive and potent story in our culture.
"Innocence" is connected to the powerful cultural forces and ideas
of religion, good and evil, and sex. "Innocence" is defined typically as
"freedom from guilt or sin" or, in the sexual sense, as "chastity."
The centrality of the conception of "innocence" to the Christian
religion is obvious. Christ is the paradigmatic "innocent victim." Mary
is the perfect embodiment of innocence as chaste. Although the concept
of "original sin" complicates the notion of innocence in Christian theol-
ogy, the striving toward innocence and the veneration of those who
come closest to achieving it and thereby suffer are important ideas in
modern Christian practice.3 5 "Blessed are those who are persecuted for
righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. '3 6
The idea of innocence also is connected to the myths and symbols
of evil. For example, Paul Ricoeur in The Symbolism of Evil demon-
strates the cultural significance of the "dread of the impure" and the
terror of "defilement." 7 The contrasting state for "impure," or the
state to which the rites of purification might return us, is "innocence,"
local governments to "whether the Supreme Court, so long the chief actor in efforts to eliminate
discrimination, will this time bar the gate").
35. "[U]nless persons are vulnerable to injury, pain, and suffering as possible consequences
of choice, choice would have no meaning. . . . [T]he necessity that moral evil be possible seems
implied in the possibility of good." R. MONK & J. STAMEY, EXPLORING CHRISTIANITY: AN INTRODUC-
TION 144 (1984) (emphasis in original). Professor Charles H. Long explored the power of religious
symbolism, particularly as it relates to questions of race. See C. LONG, SIGNIFICATIONS: SIGNS, SYM-
BOLS AND IMAGES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION (1986).
36. Matthew 5:10 (New King James).
37. P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EviL 25 (1969).
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freedom from guilt or sin. Ricoeur's thesis spans the modern and classi-
cal cultures. He makes clear the persistence and power of the symbol-
ism of evil and its always present contrast, the state of innocence.
What is central within the modern culture surely will be reflected
in its literature. And in literature the innocent victim is everywhere. In
Innocent Victims-Poetic Injustice in Shakespearean Tragedy, R.S.
White argued "that Shakespeare was constantly and uniquely con-
cerned with the fate of the innocent victim." 38 White observed, "In
every tragedy by Shakespeare, alongside the tragic protagonist who is
proclaimed by himself and others as a suffering centre, stands, some-
times silently, the figure of pathos who is a lamb of goodness: Lavinia,
Ophelia, Desdemona, Cordelia, the children."3 9 Shakespeare was not
alone in the use of women and children drawn as innocent victims. In
the work of Dickens, Hugo, Melville, and others, the suffering innocent
is a central character.4 0
The innocent victim is part of sexual practice and mythology. The
recurring myth of the "demon lover" and its innocent victim is one ex-
ample.41 Moreover, we are preoccupied with innocence in the female
partner as part of the mythological background of rape and prostitution
and in our prerequisites in the chosen marriage partner.42
The idea of the innocent victim always conjures the one who takes
away her innocence and who thereby himself becomes both the "de-
filer" and the "defiled." In literature and in life the innocent victim is
used as a means of conjuring the notion of defilement. In fact, it is im-
possible to make sense of the significance of either the "innocent vic-
tim" or the "defiler" without imagining the other. Each conception is
given real significance by its implicit contrast with the other.43 Thus,
the invocation of innocence is also the invocation of sin, guilt, and
38. R. WHITE, INNOCENT VICTIMS: POETIC INJUSTICE IN SHAKESPEAREAN TRAGEDY 5 (1986).
39. Id. at 6.
40. See, e.g., C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST (1838); V. HUGO, LES MISERABLES (1862); H. MEL-
VILLE, BILLY BUDD (1924).
41. See generally T. REED, DEMON-LOVERS AND THEIR VICTIMS IN BRITISH FICTION (1988).
42. See H. Lips & N. COLWILL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 112-13 (1978) (observ-
ing that "[iln our culture young and adolescent girls are not expected to engage in overt sexual
activity, although it is more permissible for boys to do so," and that "[sJociologically, it has been
explained in terms of parents' differential expectations of appropriate behavior for boys and
girls").
During the early times of Christianity, a woman thought to have become pregnant by a man
other than her husband was humiliated publicly by a priest. Her hair was untied and her dress
torn, and she was made to drink a potion consisting of holy water, dust, and ink. "If she suffers no
physical damage from that terrifying psychological ordeal, her innocence is presumed to have pro-
tected her." W. PHIPPS, GENESIS AND GENDEL BIBLICAL MYTHS OF SEXUALITY AND THEIR CULTURAL
IMPACT 71 (1989).
43. See P. RICOEUR, supra note 37.
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defilement.
The rhetoric of innocence in affirmative action discourse uses one
of the most powerful symbols of our culture, the symbol of innocence
and its always present opposite, the symbol of the defiled taker. When
the white person is called the innocent victim of affirmative action, the
rhetorician is invoking not just the idea of innocence but also the idea
of the not innocent, the defiled taker. The idea of the defiled taker is
given a particular name in one of two ways. First, merely invoking the
"innocent white victim" triggers at some level its rhetorically natural
opposite, the "defiled black taker." This implicit personification is
made explicit by the second part of the rhetoric, the questioning of the
"actual victim" status of the black person who benefits from the affirm-
ative action plan. The contrast is between the innocent white victim
and the undeserving black taker. The cultural significance of the ideas
of innocence and defilement thus gives the rhetoric of innocence a spe-
cial sort of power.
B. Unconscious Racism
The rhetoric of innocence draws its power not only from the cul-
tural significance of its basic terms but also from its connection with
"unconscious racism." Professor Charles Lawrence explored the concept
of "unconscious racism" and its implications for equal protection."
Lawrence introduced his sense of "unconscious racism" thus:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the
extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At
the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways
in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occa-
sions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the
behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation."5
We are each, in this sense of the word, racists.
Lawrence's thesis is disturbing especially to the white liberal who
can think of a no more offensive label than that of "racist." Moreover,
the white intellectual, whether politically liberal or conservative, typi-
cally expresses only disgust for the words and behavior of the white
44. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); see also J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970).
45. Lawrence, supra note 44, at 322 (footnotes omitted). "Simply put, while most Americans
avow and genuinely believe in the principle of equality, most white Americans still consider black
people as such to be obnoxious and socially inferior." Hazard, Permissive Affirmative Action for
the Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 379, 385.
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supremacists and neo-Nazis he connects with the label, "racist." The
dominant public ideology has become nonracist. Use of racial epithets,
expressions of genetic superiority of the white race, and avowal of for-
mal segregation are not part of the mainstream of public discourse.
These ways of speaking, which were part of the public discourse several
decades ago, are deemed by most today as irrational utterances emanat-
ing from the few remaining pockets of racism.46
Notwithstanding that the public ideology has become nonracist,
the culture continues to teach racism. The manifestations of racial ste-
reotypes pervade our media and language. Racism is reflected in the
complex set of individual and collective choices that make our schools,
our neighborhoods, our work places, and our lives racially segregated. 47
Racism today paradoxically is both "irrational and normal. '' 4 Ra-
cism is at once inconsistent with the dominant public ideology and is
embraced by each of us, albeit for most of us at the unconscious level.
This paradox of irrationality and normalcy is part of the reason for the
unconscious nature of the racism. When our culture teaches us to be
racist and our ideology teaches us that racism is evil, we respond by
excluding the forbidden lesson from our consciousness.49
The repression of our racism is a crucial piece of the rhetoric of
innocence. First, we sensibly can claim the mantle of innocence only by
denying the charge of racism. We as white persons and nonracists are
46. For an example of the evolution in public discourse, see Winter, Recent Legislation in
Mississippi on the School Segregation Problem, 28 Miss. L.J. 148, 150 n.12 (1957). Quoting Gover-
nor J.P. Coleman, Winter wrote:
I am pledged to maintenance of the separation of the races at all costs, but I want to say this
further word to the Negroes of Mississippi-As Governor I shall always give sympathetic con-
sideration to any of your problems which deserve the assistance of the state government. If
you accept this opportunity, it will mean better days for all of us. If you reject it, the respon-
sibility must be yours.
Id. (quoting Address by Governor J.P. Coleman, Miss. Legislature (Jan. 17, 1956)). Contrast this
statement with Rhodes, Enforcing the Voting Rights Act in Mississippi Through Litigation, 57
Miss. L.J. 705, 737 (1987) (emphasizing that "Mississippi should be proud to have a black Con-
gressman, a black supreme court Justice, and almost 600 other black elected officials").
47. A process known as the tipping phenomenon occurs when white families abandon a
neighborhood after the black percentage of the population exceeds a certain amount, usually be-
tween 30 and 50% black. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of
Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245, 251 (1974); see also Farley, Residential Segrega-
tion and Its Implication for School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164 (1975). In 1970 a
study of 109 cities was conducted to determine the degree of racial integration. In every one of
those cities, at least 60% of either the white or the black population would have had to shift their
places of residence to achieve complete residential integration. In all but three of those cities, the
figure was increased to at least 70%. Id. at 165. "Where neighborhoods are highly segregated,
schools tend also to be highly segregated." Id. at 187. In some Northern districts where the courts
and the HEW had not integrated schools, school segregation was even higher than would be ex-
pected based on residential segregation levels. Id.
48. Lawrence, supra note 44, at 331.
49. See id. at 335-36.
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innocent; we have done no harm to those people and do not deserve to
suffer for the sins of the other, not innocent white people who were
racists.5 0 If we accept unconscious racism, this self-conception is unrav-
eled. Second, the black beneficiaries of affirmative action can be denied
"actual victim" status only so long as racists are thought of as either
historical figures or aberrational and isolated characters in contempo-
rary culture. By thinking of racists in this way we deny the presence
and power of racism today, relegating the ugly term primarily to the
past.51 Thus, by repressing our unconscious racism we make coherent
our self-conception of innocence and make sensible the question of the
actual victimization of blacks.
The existence of unconscious racism undermines the rhetoric of in-
nocence. The "innocent white victim" is no longer quite so innocent.
Furthermore, the idea of unconscious racism makes problematic the
"victim" part of the characterization. The victim is one who suffers an
undeserved loss. If the white person who is disadvantaged by an affirm-
ative action plan is also a racist, albeit at an unconscious level, the
question of desert becomes more complicated.
The implications of unconscious racism for the societal distribution
of burdens and benefits also undermines the "innocent" status of the
white man. As blacks are burdened in a myriad of ways because of the
persistence of unconscious racism, the white man thereby is benefited.
On a racially integrated law faculty, for example, a black law professor
must overcome widespread assumptions of inferiority held by students
and colleagues, while white colleagues enjoy the benefit of the positive
presumption and of the contrast with their black colleague.52
The historical manifestations of racism have worked to the advan-
50. See Freeman, supra note 3.
51. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
52. See Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989); see
also Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White Law Schools, 20
U.S.F. L. REv. 385 (1986); Haines, Minority Law Professors and the Myth of Sisyphus: Conscious-
ness and Praxis Within the Special Teaching Challenge in American Law Schools, 10 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 247 (1988). Interestingly, this point is used by the white rhetoricians to make an argu-
ment against affirmative action. The "stigma" of affirmative action on blacks is offered as a reason
for precluding hiring preferences for blacks. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989), Justice O'Connor wrote: "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." Id. at 721.
What rarely is mentioned is that the stigma already is present through unconscious racism.
We are all taught that blacks are lazy and dumb. We do not need affirmative action to embrace an
idea that is everywhere in our culture and long predates the very idea of affirmative action. There
is no doubt, however, that many whites use the phenomenon of affirmative action as a way of
explaining this piece of unconscious racism. And of course the white rhetorician can distort the
meaning and purpose of affirmative action to fit the stereotypes of unconscious racism and thereby
feed the racism.
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tage of whites, undoubtedly. Just as slavery provided the resources to
make possible the genteel life of the plantation owner and his white
family in early nineteenth century Virginia, more than a century later
the state system of public school segregation diverted the State's re-
sources to me and not to my black peers in Virginia. The lesson of un-
conscious racism, however, is that the obvious advantages of state-
sponsored racism, the effects of which still are being reaped by whites
today, are not the only basis for skewing the societal balance sheet.
Even after the abolition of state racism, the cultural teachings persist
and unconscious racism continues to operate to the disadvantage of
blacks and the advantage of whites today. The presence and power of
unconscious racism is apparent in job interviews, in social encounters,
in courtrooms and conference rooms, and on the streets. In our culture
whites are necessarily advantaged, because blacks are presumed at the
unconscious level by most as lazy, dumb, and criminally prone. Because
the white person is advantaged by assumptions that consequently hurt
blacks, the rhetorical appeal of the unfairness to the "innocent white
victim" in the affirmative action context is undermined.
Moreover, the "actual victim" status of the black person who bene-
fits from affirmative action is much harder to question once unconscious
racism is acknowledged. Because racial discrimination is part of the cul-
tural structure, each person of color is subject to it, everywhere and at
all times.53 The recognition of unconscious racism makes odd the ques-
tion whether this person is an "actual victim."
The white rhetorician often seeks to acknowledge and, at the same
time, to blunt the power of unconscious racism by declaring that "socie-
tal discrimination" is an insufficient predicate for affirmative action.5
"Societal discrimination" never is defined with any precision in the
white rhetoric, but it suggests an ephemeral, abstract kind of discrimi-
nation, committed by no one in particular and committed against no
one in particular, a kind of amorphous inconvenience for persons of
color. By this term the white rhetorician at once can acknowledge the
idea of unconscious racism but by giving it a different name, give it a
different and trivial connotation.
The rhetoric of innocence coupled with the idea of "societal dis-
crimination" thus obscures unconscious racism and keeps rhetorically
alive the innocence of the white person and the question of actual vic-
timization of the black person. Unconscious racism meets that rhetoric
on its own terms. Once one accepts some version of the idea of uncon-
53. "The battle against pernicious racial discrimination or its effects is nowhere near won."
Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
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scious racism, the rhetoric of innocence is weakened analytically, if not
defeated.
The rhetoric of innocence and unconscious racism connect in yet
another way. Through the lens of unconscious racism the rhetoric can
be seen to embody racism. Professor Lawrence described the two types
of beliefs about the out-group held by racists:
[S]tudies have found that racists hold two types of stereotyped beliefs: They be-
lieve the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without control of their instincts
(a typical accusation against blacks), or they believe the out-group is pushy, ambi-
tious, conniving, and in control of business, money, and industry (a typical accusa-
tion against Jews)."5
The stereotype of lazy and oversexed is abundant in our culture's char-
acterization of the black person.56
The two parts of the rhetoric of innocence connect to and trigger at
55. Lawrence, supra note 44, at 333 (footnotes omitted).
56. William Brink and Louis Harris asserted that "[t]he stereotyped beliefs about Negroes
are firmly rooted in less-privileged, less-well-educated white society- the beliefs that Ne'groes smell
different, have looser morals, are lazy, and laugh a lot." W. BRINK & L. HARRIS, BLACK & WHITE
137 (1976). Angus Campbell stated:
When asked directly whether they believe the disadvantaged status of urban Negroes to
be the result of discrimination or to be "something about Negroes themselves," a majority
choose the latter explanation .... Most commonly the "something" they have in mind is
what they take to be the Negro's lack of ambition, laziness, failure to take advantage of his
opportunities.
A. CAMPBELL, WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK PEOPLE 14 (1971). Dennis Clark observed that "the
morbid preoccupation with the subject of interracial marriage and Negro sexual propensities is so
widespread in our society that it suggests a serious sickness to any thoughtful observer." D. CLARK,
THE GHETTO GAME: RACIAL CONFLICTS IN THE CITY 66 (1962). In a recent article, Wyn Craig Wade
recounted the twentieth century revival of the Klan and release of the 1915 movie, "The Birth of a
Nation," a movie which had as its centerpiece the suicide of an "innocent" white girl forced to
choose between the physical touch of a black man and death. W. WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE Ku
KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 119-39 (1987).
The stereotypical depiction of blacks has been a persistent feature of American literature. In
1937 Sterling Brown, a black poet and literary theorist, published The Negro in American Fiction,
a compelling analysis of the depiction of blacks in American literature. Brown found the stere-
otypical depiction the norm and expressed his analysis: "Whether the Negro was human was one
of the problems that racked the brains of the cultured Old South. The finally begrudged admission
that perhaps he was, has remained largely nominal in letters as in life. Complete, complex human-
ity has been denied to him." Id. at 2-3. Scholars who followed Brown also saw this tragic weakness
in our literature. Seymour Gross wrote: "[In American literature] the Negro has always been more
of a formula than a human being." Gross, Stereotype to Archetype: The Negro in American Liter-
ary Criticism, in IMAGES OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 2 (S. Gross & J. Hardy eds. 1966).
The depiction in American literature of the humanness of blacks has been expressed most
powerfully by this century's black poets, playwrights, and novelists. See N. TISCHLER, BLACK
MASKS: NEGRO CHARACTERS IN MODERN SOUTHERN FICTION 26-27 (1969).
The stereotypical depiction of blacks also has been a persistent feature of American art. A
recent art exhibition, Facing History: The Black Image in American Art 1710-1940, is devoted to
this particular instance of stereotyping. See Two Centuries of Stereotypes, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at
82-83; Black Images of American History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at 17, col. 1. See generally 4
H. HONOUR, THE IMAGE OF THE BLACK IN WESTERN ART, pts. 1 & 2 (1976).
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some level the stereotypical racist beliefs about blacks. The assertion of
the innocent white victim draws power from the implicit contrast with
the "defiled taker." The defiled taker is the black person who undeserv-
edly reaps the advantages of affirmative action. The use of the idea of
innocence, and its opposite, defilement, coalesces with the unconscious
racist belief that the black person is not innocent in a sexual sense, that
the black person is sexually defiled by promiscuity.5 7 The "over-sexed"
black person of the racist stereotype becomes the perfect implicit, and
unconsciously embraced, contrast to the innocent white person.
A similar analysis applies to the second part of the rhetoric of inno-
cence. The question whether the black person is an actual victim im-
plies that the black person does not deserve what the black person gets.
This question draws power from the stereotypical racist belief that the
black person is lazy. The lazy black seeks and takes the unearned ad-
vantages of affirmative action.
The point here is not that the white rhetorician is consciously
drawing on the stereotypical racist beliefs. Nor is the white audience
consciously embracing those beliefs when they experience the rhetoric
of innocence in affirmative action discourse. Both the rhetoricians and
their audience are likely to reject the stereotypes at the conscious level.
Moreover, they would be offended at the very suggestion that they
might hold such beliefs. The great lesson of Professor Lawrence's work
is that the beliefs are still there, even in the white liberal. The beliefs
are there because the teacher is our culture; any person who is part of
the culture has been taught the lesson of racism. While most of us have
struggled to unlearn the lesson and have succeeded at the conscious
level, none of us can slough off altogether the lesson at the unconscious
level.
IV. CONCLUSION
If we see the rhetoric of innocence as just another part of the de-
bate, we get nowhere. If instead we push past the apparently simple
forms of the rhetoric and struggle to understand the deeper currents,
perhaps we can acknowledge and then move beyond the question of our
own unconscious racism and start talking, in a hopeful and productive
way, of what we might do about it.
Examination of the rhetoric of innocence may teach us that "inno-
cence" is a powerful and very dangerous idea which simply does not
belong in the affirmative action debate. Real and good people certainly
57. See J. KOVEL, supra note 44, at 67-79. The miscegenation laws finally ruled unconstitu-
tional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), are a testament to the connection between racism
and sex.
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will suffer as a result of the use of affirmative action. Yet, we will be
much further along in our efforts to deal with that painful fact if we put
aside the loaded conception of innocence. The choice for us is not
whether we shall make innocent people suffer or not; the question is
how do we get to a world where good people, white and of color, no
longer suffer because of the accidental circumstances of their race. We
cannot get from here to there if we refuse to examine the words we use
and deny the unconscious racism that surrounds those words.
